Replication data: Individual heterogeneity and costly punishment: a volunteer’s dilemma

Replication data: Individual heterogeneity and costly punishment: a volunteer’s dilemma

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Replication data: Individual heterogeneity and costly punishment: a volunteer’s dilemma

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Title Replication data: Individual heterogeneity and costly punishment: a volunteer’s dilemma
URI http://doi.org/10.7802/1900
Primary Researcher Przepiorka, Wojtek;Utrecht University
Publication Year 2013
Availability Freier Zugang (ohne Registrierung)
Contributor Przepiorka, Wojtek;Utrecht University;Researcher
Diekmann, Andreas;ETH Zurich;Researcher
Subject Area Organizational Sociology
Other Fields of Sociology
Economic Theory
Other Fields of Economic Sciences
Social Psychology
Topic Classification Political Institutions
Group
Person, Personality, Role
Abstract Social control and the enforcement of social norms glue a society together. It has been shown theoretically and empirically that informal punishment of wrongdoers fosters cooperation in human groups. Most of this research has focused on voluntary and uncoordinated punishment carried out by individual group members. However, as punishment is costly, it is an open question as to why humans engage in the punishment of wrongdoers even in one-time-only encounters. While evolved punitive preferences have been advocated as proximate explanations for such behaviour, the strategic nature of the punishment situation has remained underexplored. It has been suggested to conceive of the punishment situation as a volunteer's dilemma (VOD), where only one individual's action is necessary and sufficient to punish the wrongdoer. Here, we show experimentally that implementing the punishment situation as a VOD sustains cooperation in an environment where punishers and non-punishers coexist. Moreover, we show that punishment-cost heterogeneity allows individuals to tacitly agree on only the strongest group member carrying out the punishment, thereby increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of social norm enforcement. Our results corroborate that costly peer punishment can be explained without assuming punitive preferences and show that centralized sanctioning institutions can emerge from arbitrary individual differences.
Geographical Area Switzerland / CH
Universe In total, 120 subjects participated in our computerized laboratory experiment. Subjects were students from the University of Zurich and ETH Zurich, 52.5% were female and they were 23.1 years old on average (sd = 3.13).
Selection Method All participants in our experiment were recruited from the subject pool maintained by the University Registration Center for Study Participants (UAST) of the University of Zurich and ETH Zurich. A random sample of participants was drawn from this subject pool and people included in this sample were invited via e-mail to participate in the experiment.
Data Collection Mode Laboratory experiment
Survey Period 2012-05-25;2012-06-01
Licenses CC BY-NC-SA 4.0
Source z-Tree, version 3.3.12
Publications Przepiorka, Wojtek and Andreas Diekmann. 2013. "Individual Heterogeneity and Costly Punishment: A Volunteer’s Dilemma." Proceedings of the Royal Society B 280(1759):20130247.;10.1098/rspb.2013.0247

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przepiorka_diekmann_2013_prsb_data.csv 257.4Kb Unknown Download {"dbk_file_desc":"Anonymized data based on which empirical results reported in the paper can be reproduced.","dbk_version_series_desc":"1.0","dbk_version_number_desc":"2019-08-15","dbk_resourcetype_series_desc":"Comma-separated values file (.csv)","dbk_resourcetype_number_desc":"Dataset","dc_language_iso_desc":"eng - (English)","dbk_dataset_variable_desc":"18","dbk_dataset_item_series_desc":"3600","dbk_dataset_item_number_desc":"","dbk_software_desc":"","dbk_alternativeid_desc":"","dbk_relatedid_series_desc":"10.1098/rspb.2013.0247","dbk_relatedid_number_desc":"IsSupplementTo","description":""}
File checksum: MD5:2d2b9b4ebac924ac0722ed69feced83f
przepiorka_diekmann_2013_prsb_variable_labels.txt 1.521Kb Text file Download {"dbk_file_desc":"Variable labels describing the 19 variables in the dataset.","dbk_version_series_desc":"1.0","dbk_version_number_desc":"2019-08-15","dbk_resourcetype_series_desc":"Text file (.txt)","dbk_resourcetype_number_desc":"Dataset","dc_language_iso_desc":"eng - (English)","dbk_dataset_variable_desc":"5","dbk_dataset_item_series_desc":"18","dbk_dataset_item_number_desc":"Other","dbk_software_desc":"","dbk_alternativeid_desc":"","dbk_relatedid_series_desc":"10.1098/rspb.2013.0247","dbk_relatedid_number_desc":"IsSupplementTo","description":""}
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przepiorka_diekmann_2013_prsb_analysis.do 13.33Kb text/x-stata-syntax Download {"dbk_file_desc":"Stata do-file that reproduces all results reported in the paper.","dbk_version_series_desc":"1.0","dbk_version_number_desc":"2019-08-15","dbk_resourcetype_series_desc":"Stata do-file (.do)","dbk_resourcetype_number_desc":"Software","dc_language_iso_desc":"eng - (English)","dbk_dataset_variable_desc":"","dbk_dataset_item_series_desc":"353","dbk_dataset_item_number_desc":"Text Unit","dbk_software_desc":"Stata, version 11 or higher","dbk_alternativeid_desc":"","dbk_relatedid_series_desc":"10.1098/rspb.2013.0247","dbk_relatedid_number_desc":"IsSupplementTo","description":""}
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