Replication data: Punitive preferences, monetary incentives and tacit coordination in the punishment of defectors promote cooperation in humans

Replication data: Punitive preferences, monetary incentives and tacit coordination in the punishment of defectors promote cooperation in humans

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Replication data: Punitive preferences, monetary incentives and tacit coordination in the punishment of defectors promote cooperation in humans

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Title Replication data: Punitive preferences, monetary incentives and tacit coordination in the punishment of defectors promote cooperation in humans
URI http://doi.org/10.7802/1909
Primary Researcher Przepiorka, Wojtek;Utrecht University
Publication Year 2015
Availability Freier Zugang (ohne Registrierung)
Contributor Diekmann, Andreas;ETH Zurich;
Przepiorka, Wojtek;Utrecht University;
Subject Area Organizational Sociology
Other Fields of Sociology
Economic Theory
Other Fields of Economic Sciences
Social Psychology
Topic Classification Political Institutions
Group
Person, Personality, Role
Abstract Peer-punishment is effective in promoting cooperation, but the costs associated with punishing defectors often exceed the benefits for the group. It has been argued that centralized punishment institutions can overcome the detrimental effects of peer-punishment. However, this argument presupposes the existence of a legitimate authority and leaves an unresolved gap in the transition from peer-punishment to centralized punishment. Here we show that the origins of centralized punishment could lie in individuals’ distinct ability to punish defectors. In our laboratory experiment, we vary the structure of the punishment situation to disentangle the effects of punitive preferences, monetary incentives, and individual punishment costs on the punishment of defectors. We find that actors tacitly coordinate on the strongest group member to punish defectors, even if the strongest individual incurs a net loss from punishment. Such coordination leads to a more effective and more efficient provision of a cooperative environment than we observe in groups of all equals. Our results show that even an arbitrary assignment of an individual to a focal position in the social hierarchy can trigger the endogenous emergence of more centralized forms of punishment.
Geographical Area Switzerland / CH
Universe In total, 216 subjects participated in our computerized laboratory experiment. Subjects were students from the University of Zurich and ETH Zurich, 57.9% were female and they were 23.1 years old on average (sd = 5.57).
Selection Method All participants in our experiment were recruited from the subject pool maintained by the University Registration Center for Study Participants (UAST) of the University of Zurich and ETH Zurich. A random sample of participants was drawn from this subject pool and people included in this sample were invited via e-mail to participate in the experiment.
Data Collection Mode Laboratory experiment
Survey Period 2014-03-13;2014-03-20
Licenses CC BY-NC-SA 4.0
Source z-Tree, version 3.3.12
Publications Diekmann, Andreas and Wojtek Przepiorka. 2015. "Punitive Preferences, Monetary Incentives and Tacit Coordination in the Punishment of Defectors Promote Cooperation in Humans." Scientific Reports 5:10321.;10.1038/srep10321

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diekmann_przepiorka_2015_sr_data.csv 464.0Kb Unknown Download {"dbk_file_desc":"Anonymized data based on which empirical results reported in the paper can be reproduced.","dbk_version_series_desc":"1.0","dbk_version_number_desc":"2018-07-07","dbk_resourcetype_series_desc":"Comma-separated values file (.csv)","dbk_resourcetype_number_desc":"","dc_language_iso_desc":"eng - (English)","dbk_dataset_variable_desc":"19","dbk_dataset_item_series_desc":"6480","dbk_dataset_item_number_desc":"","dbk_software_desc":"","dbk_alternativeid_desc":"","dbk_relatedid_series_desc":"10.1038/srep10321","dbk_relatedid_number_desc":"","description":"","format":"-1","format_description":"","bitstream_id":"1510"}
File checksum: MD5:cd4aeebdf554513a28ca73ff11e0f11a
przepiorka_diekmann_2015_sr_variable_labels.txt 1.626Kb Text file Download {"dbk_file_desc":"Variable labels describing the 19 variables in the dataset","dbk_version_series_desc":"1.0","dbk_version_number_desc":"2018-07-07","dbk_resourcetype_series_desc":"Text file (.txt)","dbk_resourcetype_number_desc":"","dc_language_iso_desc":"eng - (English)","dbk_dataset_variable_desc":"5","dbk_dataset_item_series_desc":"19","dbk_dataset_item_number_desc":"","dbk_software_desc":"","dbk_alternativeid_desc":"","dbk_relatedid_series_desc":"10.1038/srep10321","dbk_relatedid_number_desc":"","description":"","format":"6","format_description":"","bitstream_id":"1511"}
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przepiorka_diekmann_2015_sr_analysis.do 25.67Kb text/x-stata-syntax Download {"dbk_file_desc":"Stata do-file that reproduces all results reported in the paper.","dbk_version_series_desc":"1.0","dbk_version_number_desc":"2018-07-07","dbk_resourcetype_series_desc":"Stata do-file (.do)","dbk_resourcetype_number_desc":"","dc_language_iso_desc":"eng - (English)","dbk_dataset_variable_desc":"","dbk_dataset_item_series_desc":"851","dbk_dataset_item_number_desc":"","dbk_software_desc":"Stata, version 11 or higher","dbk_alternativeid_desc":"","dbk_relatedid_series_desc":"10.1038/srep10321","dbk_relatedid_number_desc":"","description":"","format":"81","format_description":"","bitstream_id":"1512"}
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