Replication data: Generosity is a sign of trustworthiness – the punishment of selfishness is not

Replication data: Generosity is a sign of trustworthiness – the punishment of selfishness is not

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Replication data: Generosity is a sign of trustworthiness – the punishment of selfishness is not

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Title Replication data: Generosity is a sign of trustworthiness – the punishment of selfishness is not
URI http://doi.org/10.7802/1944
Primary Researcher Przepiorka, Wojtek;Utrecht University
Publication Year 2016
Availability Freier Zugang (ohne Registrierung)
Contributor Przepiorka, Wojtek;Utrecht University;Researcher
Liebe, Ulf;University of Warwick;Researcher
Subject Area Social Sciences
Sociology
Organizational Sociology
Economics
Social Psychology
Topic Classification Person, Personality, Role
Group
Political Attitudes and Behavior
Abstract Peer-punishment is an important determinant of cooperation in human groups. It has been suggested that, at the proximate level of analysis, punitive preferences can explain why humans incur costs to punish their deviant peers. How punitive preferences could have evolved in humans is still not entirely understood. A possible explanation at the ultimate level of analysis comes from signaling theory. It has been argued that the punishment of defectors can be a type-separating signal of the punisher's cooperative intent. As a result, punishers are selected more often as interaction partners in social exchange and are partly compensated for the costs they incur when punishing defectors. A similar argument has been made with regard to acts of generosity. In a laboratory experiment, we investigate whether the punishment of a selfish division of money in a dictator game is a sign of trustworthiness and whether punishers are more trustworthy interaction partners in a trust game than non-punishers. We distinguish between second-party and third-party punishment and compare punitive acts with acts of generosity as signs of trustworthiness. We find that punishers are not more trustworthy than non-punishers and that punishers are not trusted more than non-punishers, both in the second-party and in the third-party punishment condition. To the contrary, second-party punishers are trusted less than their non-punishing counterparts. However, participants who choose a generous division of money are more trustworthy and are trusted more than participants who choose a selfish division or participants about whom no information is available. Our results suggest that, unlike for punitive acts, the signaling benefits of generosity are to be gained in social exchange.
Geographical Area Switzerland / CH
Universe In total, 186 subjects participated in our computerized laboratory experiment. Subjects were students from the University of Zurich and ETH Zurich, 51% were female and they were 23.6 years old on average (sd = 6.71).
Selection Method All participants in our experiment were recruited from the subject pool maintained by the University Registration Center for Study Participants (UAST) of the University of Zurich and ETH Zurich. A random sample of participants was drawn from this subject pool and people included in this sample were invited via e-mail to participate in the experiment.
Data Collection Mode Laboratory experiment
Survey Period 2014-03-25;2014-03-27
Licenses CC BY-NC-SA 4.0
Source z-Tree, version 3.3.11
Publications Przepiorka, Wojtek and Ulf Liebe. 2016. "Generosity is a sign of trustworthiness – the punishment of selfishness is not." Evolution and Human Behavior 37(4):255-262.;10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2015.12.003

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przepiorka_liebe_2016_ehb_data.csv 16.03Kb Unknown Download {"dbk_file_desc":"Anonymized data based on which empirical results reported in the paper can be reproduced.","dbk_version_series_desc":"1.0","dbk_version_number_desc":"2019-08-29","dbk_resourcetype_series_desc":"Comma-separated values file (.csv)","dbk_resourcetype_number_desc":"Dataset","dc_language_iso_desc":"eng - (English)","dbk_dataset_variable_desc":"25","dbk_dataset_item_series_desc":"186","dbk_dataset_item_number_desc":"Individual","dbk_software_desc":"","dbk_alternativeid_desc":"","dbk_relatedid_series_desc":"10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2015.12.003","dbk_relatedid_number_desc":"IsSupplementTo","description":""}
File checksum: MD5:d45485cb0771dc1adae3486c3fa1d1ef
przepiorka_liebe_2016_ehb_variable_labels.txt 2.129Kb Text file Download {"dbk_file_desc":"Variable labels describing the 25 variables in the dataset.","dbk_version_series_desc":"1.0","dbk_version_number_desc":"2019-08-29","dbk_resourcetype_series_desc":"Text file (.txt)","dbk_resourcetype_number_desc":"Dataset","dc_language_iso_desc":"eng - (English)","dbk_dataset_variable_desc":"5","dbk_dataset_item_series_desc":"25","dbk_dataset_item_number_desc":"Other","dbk_software_desc":"","dbk_alternativeid_desc":"","dbk_relatedid_series_desc":"10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2015.12.003","dbk_relatedid_number_desc":"IsSupplementTo","description":""}
File checksum: MD5:748ce7868ef90267785bcfbb1c5b8705
przepiorka_liebe_2016_ehb_analysis.do 17.84Kb text/x-stata-syntax Download {"dbk_file_desc":"Stata do-file that reproduces all results reported in the paper.","dbk_version_series_desc":"1.0","dbk_version_number_desc":"2019-08-29","dbk_resourcetype_series_desc":"Stata do-file (.do)","dbk_resourcetype_number_desc":"Software","dc_language_iso_desc":"eng - (English)","dbk_dataset_variable_desc":"","dbk_dataset_item_series_desc":"590","dbk_dataset_item_number_desc":"Text Unit","dbk_software_desc":"Stata, version 11 or higher","dbk_alternativeid_desc":"","dbk_relatedid_series_desc":"10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2015.12.003","dbk_relatedid_number_desc":"IsSupplementTo","description":""}
File checksum: MD5:da9ca2b44a771f9179a21a86c97e72e6

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